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cases or in cases involving the other, as yet, untested "personal use"
statutes. While they are not direct authority, Mugler, the employment
contract cases, and the fluoridation cases all contain some language to
the effect that it is a legitimate exercise of the police power to legislate
for an individual's well-being. It seems that such individual oriented
legislation will frequently be sustained as the majority of motorcycle
helmet cases indicate. Therefore, courts need no longer circumvent
the issue. They may now accept the power of the state to protect
an individual from himself, and explicitly hold that there is a valid
relationship between the individual and the public welfare. Whether
one agrees with the result in Davids or not the case was correct in
stating that it stretches a point to say that requiring a motorcyclist
to wear a helmet actually protects the public welfare. Carmichael
apparently recognized this in basing its decision on the interest of the
state in "robust, healthy citizens." Nor will forthright acceptance of
state power with regard to the individual's welfare open a floodgate
of paternalistic legislation, since every exercise of police power is still
subject to the fourteenth amendment requirements of being reason-
able and of not being arbitrary or capricious. 43
WILLIAM F. STONE, JP.
THE PRESENCE REQUIREMENT AND THE "POLICE-
TEAM" RULE IN ARREST FOR MISDEMEANORS
Under the common law a police officer could arrest, without a
warrant, anyone who had committed a misdemeanor in his presence
amounting to a breach of the peace.' Within the last twenty years,
however, most states have discarded the breach-of-the-peace require-
ment, while retaining the in-the-presence requirement.2 In those states
which have retained this latter requirement it is considered an
"Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v.
Illinois, 20o U.S. 561 (19o6); Reynolds v. Louisiana Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 249 La. 127, 185 So. 2d 794 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 946 (1966).
"For cases discussing the common law rule see Commonwealth v. Dias, 349
Mass. 583, 211 N.E.2d 224 (1965); Brunson v. State, 168 Tex. Grim. 113, 323 S.W.2d
597 (1959).
-See, e.g., State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (Super. Ct. 1965);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West Supp. 1967); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.874 (1954); N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. § 177 (McKinney Supp. 1968); Oulo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03
(Baldwin 1964).
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essential element in the law or arrest.3 Recently in Robinson v. State,4
the scope of the presence requirement was significantly broadened in
Maryland.
In Robinson an officer on routine patrol noticed that a lock on
a fence had been cut, and that the door of a storehouse within the
fence enclosure had been opened. The officer observed four men
within the storehouse who, upon seeing the police officer, fled. When
he was unable to apprehend them, the officer radioed a "lookout"5
for the offense of "storehouse breaking,"O and described the clothing
worn by two of the suspects. Within minutes another officer observed
two hitchhikers who were less than a mile from the storehouse and
whose clothing matched the radioed description. He arrested them
without obtaining a warranty The men were subsequently convicted
and on appeal Robinson attacked the validity of his arrest contending
that a misdemeanor had not been committed "in the presence" of
the arresting officer.8
3E.g., State v. Fenner, 263 N.C. 694, 140 S.E.2d 349 (1965); St. Paul v. Webb,
256 Minn. 210, 97 N.W.2d 638 (1959).
44 Md. App. 515, 243 A.2d 879 (1968).
5A "lookout" is a central radio broadcast to all elments of the police force
alerting them of the commission of a crime and a description, when possible, of
suspects to be apprehended in connection therewith.
GThe statutory offense of "storehouse breaking" consists of breaking into a
storehouse, filling station, garage, trailer, cabin, diner, warehouse, or other out-
house in the day or night with an intent to commit a murder or felony therein
or with the intent to steal, take, or carry away the personal goods of another of
the value of one hundred dollars or more. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 32 (Supp.
1968). This was originally a misdemeanor. However by virtue of Ch. 628 (1966)
Md. Acts this offense now constitutes a felony but not in relation to violations
occurring before June 1, 1966. The offense alleged in this case occurred on July
4, 1965-
The rules of arrest without a warrant in Maryland are based solely upon
case law. At the time of the offense in question, an arrest without a warrant by
a police officer was valid where the officer had probable cause to believe at the
time of the arrest that a felony had been committeed and that the person arrested
had committed it. However, when the offense was a misdemeanor, such arrest was
valid only where he had probable cause to believe that the misdemeanor had
been, or was being committed in his presence or view, and that the arrestee was
the misdemeanant. 243 A.2d at 884.
"Traditionally, a misdemeanor occurs in a policeman's presence if he is made
aware of its commission by one or more of his physical senses. Davids v. State,
2o8 Md. 377, 118 A.2d 636, 637 (1955). He may be alerted by the sight, sound,
or smell of the crime. Clay v. United States, 239 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1956); People
v. Burgess, 170 Cal. App. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 524 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The require-
ment itself represents an early nineteenth-century social balance. The deplorable
conditions of jails and the resulting need to protect the individual from mistaken
or arbitrary arrest outweighed the harm to society arising from most misdemeanors.
Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 5 MD. L. REv. 125 (1941)-
It is interesting to note that a misdemeanor may never have occurred within
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In determining that the arrest was valid the court noted that the
felony-misdemeanor distinction, with reference to the law of arrest
in Maryland, was obsolete. The court stressed that there is sometimes
little correlation between the designation of a crime as either a
felony or a misdemeanor and its heinousness or the attendant severity
of its punishment.9 It then noted that prior decisions had held that
the presence requirement was complied with when the crime com-
mitted was a felony and the arrest without a warrant was predicated
upon a police broadcast. 10 Therefore, the court felt justified in ex-
tending the "police-team" rule in order to legalize misdemeanor arrests
under such circumstances.
The "police-team" rule, as originally promulgated," modified the
presence requirement by saying that there was presence when one
member of a small investigatory police team sees the alleged mis-
demeanor occur and another member arrests the misdemeanant shortly
thereafter upon the information of the witnessing officer. It was thus
addressed to the situation where the non-witnessing officer who effects
the arrest is working immediately with the witnessing officer. In
Robinson, however, the officers were on independent and separate
patrols; the arresting officer became aware of the crime only by
virtue of the radio alert and not by prior integrated activity. The use
of the rule in this situation therefore represents an extension of the
original rule.
In 1939 the Interstate Commission on Crime met to re-examine
the laws of arrest.' 2 It found that most misdemeanor arrests were
illegal in their inception because of an inadequacy of the arrest rules-
rules antedating both modern police technology and modern social
factors.' 3 It concluded that police could not effectively protect society
under the existing laws of arrest.' 4 The Commission suggested a
thorough revision of those rules and presented its recommendations
for a workable scheme in the Uniform Arrest Act.15 Section six of
the presence of the first officer. He discovered Robinson in the building, but the
"breaking"-the severing of the lock and the opening of the door-did not occur
in his presence. The court, without discussion, said that he had reasonable grounds
to believe that it had occurred in his presence.
"At least the court felt this was true with respect to Maryland law.
"The court cited Lamot v. State, 2 Md. App. 378, 234 A.2d 615 (1967) and
Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 197 A.2d 434 (1964).
uSilverstein v. State, 176 Md. 533, 6 A.2d 465 (1939).
"Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 315-16, 331-34 (1942).
131d. at 315.
141d.
a1Uniform Arrest Act (1936) § 6 (1) B, as cited in Warner, 28 VA. L. REV. 315,
345 (19-12).
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the Act dropped the "presence" requirement for misdemeanor arrests:
An arrest by a peace officer without a warrant for a mis-
demeanor is lawful whenever: .... (B) He has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
a misdemeanor out of his presence, either within the state or
without the state, if law enforcement officers of the state where
the misdemeanor was committed so request, and will not be
apprehended unless immediately apprehended. 16
Although the Act eliminated the presence requirement, it imposed the
requirement of reasonableness.
Prior to the Uniform Act only Georgia and Illinois had eliminated
by statute the presence requirement.17 Since the Act nine additional
jurisdictions have eliminated the requirement from their codes.' s
The relevant code sections of six of these eleven states eliminate the
felony-misdemeanor distinction for purposes of the law of arrest and
allow a policeman to arrest when he has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the person is committing or has committed an "offense."' 9
The code provisions of the other two states retain the felony-mis-
demeanor distinction but allow an arrest absent presence if the




"GA. CODE ANN. § 27-207 (1933); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §107-2 (Smith-Hurd
1964).
18COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-2-20 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 6-49 (Supp.
1968); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 255-5 (1955); IOWA CODE ANN. § 755.4 (1946); LA. CRIM.
PRO. CODE ANN. art. 213 (West 1966); MONT. REv. CODFS ANN. § 95-6o8 (1968);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-22-8.2 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-3 (1956); ,VIs. STAT.
ANN. § 954.03 (1958). A tenth state, Missouri, has dropped the presence requirement
for the police of the city of St Louis. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 84.090 (1956). Most states
have removed the presence requirement in the instance of traffic volations. E.g.,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-O6-15.1 (96O); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-100 (1960).
29CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 6-49 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-207 (1933);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 755.4 (1946);
LA. CRIM. CODE ANN. art. 213 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-22-8.2 (1967).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 7554 (1946) is typical of this type:
A peace officer may make an arrest ... without a warrant:
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. Where a public offense has in fact been committed, and he has reason-
able ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed
it.
3. Where he has reasonable ground for believing that an indictable public
offense has been committed and has reasonable ground for believing
that the person to be arrested has committed it....
2Wis. STAT. ANN. § 954.03 (1958). R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-3 (1956) provides'
A peace officer may without a warrant arrest a person for a misde-
meanor, whenever:
(a) The officer has reasonable ground to believe that a misdemeanor has
1969] CASE COMMENTS 123
The remaining states, by either statute or case law, still require
that the misdemeanor occur in the officer's presence.21 Three of
these jurisdictions have held that the presence requirement can be
complied with by the use of the "police-team" rule.22 In Prosser v.
Parsons,23 ten game wardens posted themselves one evening at in-
tervals along a rural highway. They suspected that illegal night-
hunting, a misdemeanor,24 was being committed frequently. One
officer observed Prosser hunting and radioed the information to
Parsons, one of the wardens. Parsons intercepted Prosser and arrested
him despite the fact that he was not hunting at the time of the actual
been or is being committed in his presence and that the person to be
arrested in fact has committed or is commiting it.
(b) The person to be arrested in fact has committed or is committing a
misdemeanor in the presence of the officer, and in such case it shall be
immaterial that the officer did not believe him gulity or on unrea-
sonable ground entertained belief in his guilt.
(c) The officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a misdemeanor and either has fled from the
scene of the crime or is a non-resident of this state and cannot be
arrested later.
See State v. McWeeney, 216 A.2d 357 (R.I. 1966).
*"Numerous states have by code retained the "presence" requirement: ALA.
CODE tit. 15, § 154 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.O30 (1962); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1403 (Supp. 1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-403 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836
(West Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 19o6 (1953); (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15
(Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-603 (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1024 (1956);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13-623 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 704 (1964); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 28, et als (1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.874 (1954); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 629.34 (1945); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2470 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 594:10 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:2-1 (1955); N.Y. CODE CRIa. PROC. § 177
(McKinney Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1541 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15
(Supp. 1967); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 196 (1937); ORE. REV. STAT. § 133.310 (1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-253
(1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-803 (1955); TEX. CODE CRIi. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01
(Supp. 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-3 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-2 (1966);
WVo. STAT. ANN. § 7-155 (1957).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1024 (1956) is representative: "All ... sheriffs ... police
officers ... may arrest and detain any person found violating any law of this state,
until a legal warrant can be obtained."
Five states whose rules of arrest are n the form of case law only retain "pres-
ence" as a necessary element of misdemeanor arrest without a warrant: Robinson
v. State, 4 Md. 515, 243 A.2d 879 (1968); State v. Parker, 378 S.W.2d 274, 281 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1964); Commonwealth v. Garrick, 21o Pa. Super. 124, 232 A.2d 8 (Super.
Ct. 1967); Williams v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 667, 128 S.E. 572 (1925); (dictum);
Kilcup v. McManus, 64 Wash. 2d 771, 943 P.2d 375 (196i4). Vermont has not decided
the question, but would presumably follow the common law rule. See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 5507 (1958).
=People v. Craig, 152 Ca. 42, 91 P. 997 (19o7); Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App.
515, 243 A.2d 879 (1968); Prosser v. Parsons, 245 S.C. 493, 141 S.E.2d 342 (1965).
3245 S.C. 493, 141 S.E.2d 342 (1965).
'S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-302 (1962).
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arrest. Nevertheless, the validity of the arrest was upheld. The court
said that "[u]nder these circumstances, an act taking place within the
view of one officer was in legal effect within the [presence and] view
of the other cooperating officers .... ,,25
The "police-team" rule is a fiction to satisfy the presence require-
ment.2 6 It is based upon the theory that a team is one body, such
that what is done in the presence of one member is done in the
presence of all. The use of the police radio supports this fiction by
creating a proximity of awareness, purpose, and reliance between
those officers in communication. The ability of an officer to place
a fast radio "lookout" for an elusive criminal means that the other
alerted policemen are acting merely as the long arm of the original
officer in a form of rapid, although constructive, pursuit by that
original officer.
27
The "police-team" rule liberalizes the presence requirement to
the extent of eliminating it for the non-witnessing arresting offcer.
Thus, like Section 6(i)B of the Uniform Arrest Act, the criterion for
the legality of the arrest is reasonableness. The fourth amendment
of the Constitution forbids an "unreasonable" seizure of the person.2
The primary question, therefore, is whether a "police-team" arrest
is in fact constitutionally "unreasonable," that is, whether presence
is an indelible requirement of constitutional reasonableness. The ques-
tion has not been litigated.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that in the
absence of a preemptive federal statute, the validity of an arrest is
determined by the law of the state where the arrest occurs.29 The
state law, however, must comply with the fourth amendment's stand-
ard of reasonableness.3 0 A reasonable arrest has been held to mean
one made upon probable cause.31 An officer has probable cause to
arrest a suspected felon without a warrant if he has reasonable grounds
to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person to
2141 S.E.2d at 346; accord, People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 91 P. 997 (1907).
-'See generally cases cited note 23 supra.
"A court might also use the fiction of the continuing nature of several types
of crimes to satisfy the presence requirement. It could be argued that the mis-
demeanor continues as long as the misdemeanant remains a fugitive so that the
misdemeanor is actually committed in the presence of the arresting officer.
2U.S. CONsT. amend. IV, "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."
OUnited States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948).
3'Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (ig6i), with Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967)-
3'Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 16o (1949).
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be arrested committed it.32 If the felony occurred in the presence of
an officer, the probable cause test would be met. Moreover, it has
been held33 that when an officer without a warrant arrests a suspected
felon upon the basis of a radio "lookout" it is sufficient that some other
member of the force have probable cause.34 Therefore, when it is
found that the felony-misdemeanor distinction in the laws of arrest
is obsolete, it is reasonable to say that when an officer without a
warrant arrests a suspected midemeanant upon the basis of a radio
"lookout," he had probable cause if the crime occurred in the presence
of the radioing officer. All of this assumes that "presence" is a
necessary element of "probable cause." It is not. The fourth amend-
ment only requires that the arrest be upon reasonable grounds. The
presence requirement is a creation of statute or case law; it is not
imposed by the constitutional prohibition against "unreasonable
seizure." "An arrest by a police officer or a private person for a
misdemeanor or offense not committed 'in their presence' violates no
constitutional standard, state or federal. Several state statutes authorize
such arrests for 'past' misdemeanors." 35 The presence requirement thus
appears to be but one method by which "probable cause" can be
found.
A different approach to the constitutional inquiry is to view a
policeman as the most reliable informant. The Supreme Court has
held that when a policeman has received information concerning a
felony from a reliable citizen-informer such information has consti-
tuted reasonable grounds for arrest without a warrant.30 Therefore,
if the felony-misdemeanor distinction insofar as the law of arrest is
concerned is no longer applicable, the information of a "policeman-
informant" would provide the necessary reasonable grounds for the
making of the arrest.
The "police-team" rule would thus appear to meet constitutional
requirements. The rule as extended in Robinson does, however, suffer
the weakness of a lack of internal limitation as to the size of the
co-operating unit. With the means of modern communication sys-
tems it would seem that the individuals of a county force, a state force,
2MilIer v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959).
'Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 197 A.2d 434 (1964).
"The court in Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 197 A.2d 434 (1964), spoke of
the police force in terms of a "police team." This is precedent for the extended
use of the term in the principal case.
2Lurie v. District, 56 Misc. 2d 68, 288 N.Y.S.2d 256, 261 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
1"McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959).
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or the sum of individual officers of all fifty state forces are equally
related so that a misdemeanor committed before one officer might
qualify any member of any force to arrest the misdemeanant without
a warrant. Those jurisdictions which have used the "police-team" rule
have not had occasion to arrest, without a warrant, a fugitive from
another state. Nor is it likely that they will since the police of the
state into which the fugitive has fled are usually made aware of his
possible presence by the issuance of an arrest warrant by a sister state.
But the applicability of the "police-team" rule in such a situation is
an open question. Speculating as to the outcome, the doctrine would
probably not be applied. Such factors as state sovereignty and the
need for extradition proceedings are in conflict with the theorized
unity required by the "police-team" rule. These two considerations
would not be applicable to the situation where the officers in a "police-
team" arrest were merely from different counties within the same
state or where one was a county officer and the other a state police-
man of the same state. Thus, although they belong to independent
organizations, it would not seem that they are as theoretically separate.
The amount of daily contact and coordination between such officers
is also greater than with officers of other states. Therefore, it would
seem that the "police-team" could well be applied between them.
The rule, especially as applied in Robinson, significantly liberalizes
the presence requirement, but it is limited in its application. Pres-
ently, it stretches the presence requirement only in the case of police-
men. One member of the force must himself witness the misdemeanor
while another officer, acting pursuant to a police broadcast, must arrest
the misdemeanant. Robinson made it clear that the requirement will
not be met when the first officer is told of the crime by a citizen
witness and then places the radio alert.37 Similarly, the requirement
will not be met if a central police broadcast is predicated upon a
citizen's call to police headquarters. In no way does the "police-team"
rule purport to alter the common law rule38 that a private citizen can
arrest a misdemeanant without a warrant only when the misdemeanor
was committed in his presence and amounted to a breach of the
peace.
Absent the "police-team" rule, the presence requirement demands
that in a misdemeanor arrest without a warrant, the witnessing and
the arresting officer be the same person. With the existent speed and
37243 A.2d at 888.
"See Wilson Line, Inc. v. Brown, 164 Md. 698, 166 A. 426 (933); Baltimore &
O.R.R. v. Cain, 81 Md. 87, Vs A. 8oi (1895).
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availability of transportation, criminals can quickly leave the scene
of the crime. It is often virtually impossible for one officer to chase
a suspect for many miles, especially in urban areas, and the immediate
cooperation of other police is necessary to prevent his escape. A
warrant cannot issue, in most instances, because it must be in the
name of a known person or must specifically identify the suspect.39
Therefore, it is virtually impossible for any other officer to make the
arrest. The presence requirement thus shackles police efficiency
and the use of modern communications equipment.
In order to alleviate this situation the "police-team" rule was
developed. However, when it is necessary to use a fiction in order to
arrest persons reasonably suspected of an offense, there is something
apparently wrong with the laws of arrest as they exist. The problem,
therefore, does not lie with the use of the fiction, but with that element
upon which the fiction is predicated. The presence requirement which
is what distinguishes felonies and misdemeanors in the law of arrest
without a warrant should be eliminated. Only failing this should
the "police-team" remedy be used.
The reason for the felony-misdemeanor distinction in the law of
arrest no longer exists, and therefore, the reason for the existence of
the presence requirement no longer exists. The felony-misdemeanor
distinction in arrest was predicated upon a social balance between
the needs of the individual and the needs of society in nineteenth-
century England.4 0 However, considerations which gave rise to this
distinction have generally disappeared. 4'
Rather than force a court to employ a fiction to legalize a reason-
able arrest, state legislatures should drop the presence requirement
and the felony-misdemeanor distinction in the law of arrest. An arrest
upon reasonable grounds clearly and directly meets the requirements
of the fourth amendment.
J. TERRY ROACH
3U.S. Cosr. amend. IV.
'0Kauffraan, supra note 8.
"Id. at 15o. For example, at common law an assault with intent to rob, murder,
rape, or have carnal knowledge of a woman amounted to a misdemeanor. Robinson
v. State, 4 Md. App. 515, 243 A.2d 879, 884 n.5 (1968). The nature of these crimes
is now considered more heinous.
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